Statutory History
From the beginning, Congress was concerned with the weak bargaining power of a neophyte author who might sign away a timeless literary work for a mess of pottage. It has always attempted to redress that by giving the publisher the initial rewards, but allowing the author to revisit the terms if the work became successful. Stewart v. Abend, 495 U. S. 207, 218 (1990) .
In 1938, the Copyright Act of 1909 was in effect. Under the Act, authors held copyright for twenty-eight years with a renewal period of a second twenty-eight. The author in theory held the power of the renewal over the publisher in seeking a better bargain. Stewart, 495 U.S. at 218-19. Of course this was easily thwarted by the publisher requiring the author to assign both initial and renewal copyrights at the same time, and the Supreme Court approved the practice in Fred Fisher Music Co. v. M. Witmark & Sons, 318 U. S. 643 (1943) .
In the 1976 amendments to the Copyright Act (taking effect in 1978) , Congress attempted to revive the original scheme. The two twenty-eight year terms were replaced by one long term of seventy-five years from date of copyright. 17 U.S.C. § 304(b) (1997) .
And for post and pre-1978 works, an inalienable right of authors and heirs to terminate the grant.
There is no discussion as to why for pre-1978 works that is not an ex-post facto law prohibited by the Constitution.
17 U.S.C. § 304(c)gives the termination right to the author, or where dead, his children or children of a dead heir, exactly the case with Thomas and the son of John IV. If a widow exists, the ownership of copyright is divided between the two camps. Elaine would have held a one-half interest in the termination right, but she was now dead.
The grant can't be terminated at any time at the author's whim. There is a limited five year window to terminate beginning at the end of fifty-six years from date of copyright or January 1, 1978, whichever is later. 17 U.S.C. § 304(c) (3).
Which No, I don't get why the second cluster was ten years later when it was added to the contract one year later.
In the 1998 amendments to the Act, the term of years was extended to ninety-five years, and the time to terminate was also extended if it had not been exercised. Now it was five years to terminate beginning at the end of 75 years from date of copyright. Id. Section 304(d).
The Steinbecks were trying to use this later period.
The Litigation
Well, Penguin did not care for this one bit and sought a declaratory judgment as to the validity of the termination. In 1994, Elaine had entered a new agreement with Penguin including all the works, some new Steinbeck works, and some works by Elaine. And with a much larger guaranteed annual advance. The language said it canceled and superseded the 1938 agreement.
The district court held against Penguin.
Going to the Next Level
The language of the 1994 agreement makes clear that the parties intended it to supersede the 1938 one. They agreed to a rescission and entered a new contract. Jones v. Trice, 202 A.D.2d 394, 395 (2d Dep't 1994) .
The 1994 contract obligated Penguin to pay more money to Elaine and to keep more Steinbeck books in print. Termination rights under the Copyright Act are statutory, however, and not dependent on the intent of Elaine and Penguin. Those statutory rights are determined by the date a grant of rights was executed. And the pre-1978 grant of rights no longer existed. No termination right was exercised before the 1994 contract, but the threat of termination was in the hands of Elaine Steinbeck when she negotiated. Thus the intent of the Act was observed. This is the inalienable right idea. The Second Circuit said don't read this too broadly.
Steinbeck heirs cited Marvel Characters, Inc. v. Simon, 310 F.3d 280 (2d Cir. 2002) in which the author was "coerced" into recharacterizing an existing work as one "made for hire." The after-the-fact relabeling eliminated an author's termination right, and this was an example of the "agreement to the contrary" the Act proscribed.
True A new faculty member at a state college (A) wants to place several articles on reserve in the library for her class. She accessed these articles through full-text databases at the library of the major state university (B) where she is enrolled as a graduate student. The faculty member has asked if she can send a PDF from (B)'s databases to the library staff at (A) to be placed on e-reserve. In the alternative, may she make paper copies that could then be scanned for e-reserve as long as she signs (A)'s agreement to seek copyright permission?
ANSWER: This database of full-text articles are licensed to (B) , and the use is probably restricted to (B)'s own faculty, staff and students. Although (A)'s new faculty member is a also a student at (B), and therefore has access as a student for her own research and study, duplicating the articles in any format and putting them on either print or e-reserve at (A) likely is infringement. There is some possibility that (A), as an institution in the state system, is covered under the same license agreement, but not definitely so. This is a matter of contract law rather than of copyright. Whether the faculty member makes paper copies from the database or sends a PDF file, the issue is ANSWER: Libraries are not required to retain ILL records by law, but Congress appointed a commission (CONTU) to develop ILL guidelines. The CONTU guidelines received serious support from Congress and were published in the Conference Report that accompanied the 1976 Copyright Act. The guidelines require that borrowing libraries retain records of titles borrowed for three calendar years. The records need be only by titles requested within each of the three calendar years. There is no requirement to keep payment or charge records.
QUESTION: A teacher wants to use photographs and other material in a professional presentation for which he is not being paid. Is this the same as an "educational" presentation since it is an employment enhancing activity?
ANSWER: The Copyright Act does not automatically exempt even educational presentations. The fair use exception sometimes permits use in a nonprofit educational institution for instruction, but not always. Section 110(1) covers classroom performances and displays which is a limitation on the exclusive rights of the copyright holder. Professional presentations may or may not be fair use, but they are not the same as use in a nonprofit educational institution and do not qualify under 110(1). If the presentation is live and no copies are distributed of the images, etc., it may be fair use, but not definitely. Often speakers use images without permission for such presentations and assume that they are fair use, which they may be. If the presentation is to be placed on a Website, then the presenter should remove the copyrighted works or seek permission to use the photographs and other materials. 
Cases of Note from page 68
but a way to convince people they were working for a team in the factories with a focused goal and a greater team, the USA with a far bigger picture of the world. Articles on inter-factory sports, new designs, plane part improvements, families, awards, deaths, imprisonments, testing successes and much more were the heart and soul of the papers and a
Something to Think About from page 66
remembrance now of tougher times. When I read the material, I do not believe there is much difference in today's misery, but I can also see some of the equality and diversity changes that have occurred and wonder if we need to be more proactive in saving this material. I'm dreaming and working toward an eventual grant project to preserve this material on film and digitally. Do you have some resources of your own that are so precious you would grieve at their loss? Is it worth thinking about a way to save it? I believe that gives us all something to think about!
